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Abstract
Corporate organization varies within a country and across coun-
tries with country size. The paper starts by establishing some
facts about corporate organization based on unique data of 660
Austrian and German corporations. The larger country (Ger-
many) has larger firms with flatter and more decentralized cor-
porate hierarchies compared to the smaller country (Austria).
Firms in the larger country change their organization less fast
than firms in the smaller country. Over time firms have been
introducing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power
to lower levels of the corporation. We develop a theory which
explains these facts and which links these features to the trade
environment that countries and firms face. We introduce firms
with internal hierarchies in a Krugman (1980) cum Melitz and
Ottaviano (2007) model of trade. We show that international
trade and the toughness of competition in international markets
induce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to decen-
tralized corporate hierarchies. We oer empirical evidence which
is consistent with the models predictions.
JEL Classification: F12, F14, L22, D23
Keywords: international trade with endogenous firm organiza-
tions, endogenous congruence in the firm, corporate organization
in similar countries, empirical test of the theory of the firm
1 Introduction
Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries with
country size. We establish some stylized facts about corporate organization
for two countries which are similar in many dimensions like factor endow-
ments, geography, institutions, culture, language, but market size. With
a population of 8 million Austria is one tenth the size of Germany with a
population of 82 million people.1We document the pattern of corporate orga-
nization based on unique data of 460 German and 200 Austrian corporations
in 1998-1999.2
Corporate organization appears to vary with country size. The larger
country (Germany) has firms with more decentralized corporate decision
making compared to the smaller country (Austria). Table 1 provides an illus-
tration of this fact. In Austria, almost 40 percent of firms organize corporate
decisions centrally at the top of the organization (at the CEO level) compared
to 24.4 percent of German corporations. German corporations tend to have
an internal power allocation which is shared between the CEOs/owners at
the top of the organization and middle managers at the divisional level (50.4
percent of firms in Germany compared to 41.3 percent in Austria). Firms are
ranked by their level of centralization of decision making for several corpo-
rate decisions. The numbers in Table 1 are means of a ranking of corporate
decision making between 1 (centralized) and 5 (decentralized) depending on
whether the CEO/owner or middle managers at the divisional level take the
decision (see footnotes of Table 1 and Tables A1 and A2 of the the Data
Appendix for a more detailed description).
1In 1998 Austria had an export ratio of 44.9 percent of GDP and Germany of 28.7
percent.
2For more details on the data see the Appendix and Marin (2006).
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Figure 1 illustrates a second fact about corporate organization across
firms and countries. Across the two countries, the larger country Germany
has larger firms compared to Austria when measured by firms’ sales. Within
each of the two countries, the allocation of power inside the corporation
appears to vary with firm size. Larger firms tend to have a more decentralized
organization of decision making compared to smaller firms.
2
horizontal axis: level of decentralization of corporate decisions, see footnotes 2 and 3 of Table 1 for defintion.
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Table 2 unveils a third pattern of the data. Organizational change ap-
pears to vary with country size. Firms in the smaller more open economy
change their organization faster than firms in the larger less open country.
In Austria, the share of firms with a new organization (less than two years
of age) is almost twice as large compared to Germany.
Table 3 illustrates the fourth fact. Over time, firms have been introduc-
ing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power to lower levels of the
corporation. In 1999 (today), 26.5 percent of German firms use the central-
ized U-form organization compared to 45.5 percent before. Table 3 shows a
gradual decline since 1989 (over the last 10 years) in the importance of the
U-form organization in which power is concentrated at the top of the corpo-
rate hierarchy. Firms have been shifting towards the decentralized M-form
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organization which introduces profit centers at the divisional level providing
incentives for workers at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. The impor-
tance of the M-form organization increased from 10.5 percent of firms using
it before to 20.5 percent adopting it in 1999. A similar more pronounced
trend towards less hierarchical organizations can be found for Austria.3 4
The described features raise several questions. First, can dierences in
countries’ trade exposure account for the observed corporate diversity across
countries and firms? Second, why are firms changing their mode of organi-
zation? Can an increased integration into world markets explain this trend
towards less hierarchical organizations?
In this paper we oer a model that explains these facts. We introduce
firms with internal hierarchies (a CEO and a division manager) in a monop-
olistic competition model of trade. Our model simultaneously determines
firms’ organizational choices and heterogeneity across firms in size and pro-
ductivity. Moreover, in our model firms choose their organization in response
to the trade environment they face.
We develop an industry equilibrium model with a monopolistic competi-
tive sector with dierentiated goods that combines the Aghion-Tirole (1997)
3For the distinction between the M- and the U-form organization see Williamson (1975).
4Empirical evidence on the changing nature of corporate hierarchies is scarce. Besides
anecdotal evidence in the business press there are a few studies which document these
corporate changes for US corporations see Ostermann (1996), Holmstrom and Kaplan
(2001), Rajan and Wulf (2006).
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(AT) theory of the firm with the Krugman (1980) theory of international
trade. Rather than using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
as in Krugman (1980), we adopt the Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) frame-
work with linear demand across a continuum of varieties. This way the price
elasticity of demand is no longer exogenously fixed and changes with the
toughness of competition in the market. Consumers have preferences over
varieties. Production of the varieties in the monopolistic sector is as in AT. A
principal hires an agent to monitor projects and workers to produce. There
are p potential methods of production of which one maximizes profits and
another one maximizes a private benefit for the agent. Hence, there is a
conflict of interest between the principal/owner and her agent as the payos
of the parties depend on who’s project is implemented. The principal and
the agent gather information which of the p ways to run the firm maximizes
profits and the private benefit of the agent, respectively. If both parties find
out which are their preferred projects, the decision rights reside in the party
with formal power. If only one of the parties learns which her preferred
project is, the uninformed party always rubber-stamps this project. In this
case, the informed party has real power. In choosing between keeping formal
power or delegating power to the agent, the principal trades o the benefit
from control against the manager’s loss of initiative.
The first result of the paper states that the conflict of interest between the
principal and her agent (the power struggle in the firm) increases with the
intensity of competition in the market. When competition becomes tougher
(with an increase in the number of firms and/or with an increase in the share
of low cost firms in the market) relative profits decline between a firm in which
the agent has power (an A-firm) and a firm in which the principal decides
over the project (a P-firm). Hence, it becomes more costly to delegate power
to the agent. It matters more who runs the firm, because as competition
increases high-cost A-firms’ revenues go down by more than those of low-
cost P-firms and they try to fight the loss in revenues by lowering mark-ups
by more than P-firms.
We then solve for the industry equilibrium (imposing free entry). We
find that the power struggle in firms increases the stakes of firms and thus
increases the free entry profit level that firms require to enter the market.
We find further, that the power struggle in firms aects the corporate equi-
librium that emerges in the economy. When the conflict of interest between
the principal and her agent is small, preferences over projects between the
principal and her agent are fairly congruent and the principal invests little in
information collection. Under these circumstances the initiative of the agent
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can be kept alive and there are no costs of control. Hence, principals find
it optimal to keep control. On the other hand, when the conflict of interest
is large, the principal’s investment in information collection will also tend
to be large, and the agent’s initiative will be killed even when he is given
formal power. Hence, there is no gain in assigning formal power to the agent
and principals keep control. Finally, there may exist intermediate levels of
conflict in the firm for which principals find it optimal to delegate formal
power to their agents to induce them to invest in information collection.
Next, we open the economy up to trade by examining changes in market
size. Interestingly, we find that the size of nations is an important determi-
nant of the equilibrium mode of organization. In small countries competition
tends to be weak and the conflict of interest between principals and middle
managers will also tend to be small and principals tend to monitor little.
On the other hand, in large countries, competition and the power struggle
in firms are both intense and principals tend to monitor a lot. It follows
that small and large countries will tend to have firms in which principals
keep formal control, while in medium sized countries firm organizations may
prevail in which power is delegated to middle managers.
Finally, we derive predictions from our model and expose them to the
data. We predict that in a cross section of firms, firms will have more de-
centralized corporate hierarchies in larger countries. Organizational change
towards less hierarchical firms is, however, more likely to happen in smaller
countries. We predict further, that in a cross section of firms, the power
struggle between CEOs/owners and middle managers will be more intense in
larger more competitive countries. We test these predictions for a cross sec-
tion of firms with unique data of 660 corporations in Austria and Germany
in 1998-1999. We find that these predictions are not rejected by the data.5
The paper contributes to a new body of literature on organizations in gen-
eral equilibrium models of international trade.6 In their theory of the firm
Aghion and Tirole (1997) assume an exogenous degree of conflict between
CEOs/owners and middle managers in the firm. We endogenize the power
5Recently, a new empirical literature has emerged which investigates the determinants
of how firms are organized. Acemoglu et al (2005, 2007) examine the role of technology
for vertical integration and the decentralization of firms, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)
investigate the role of competition for management practices in four OECD countries,
and Marin (2006) and Nunn and Trefler (2008) analyse the boundaries of multinational
corporations.
6For a survey of this literature, see Marin and Verdier (2003a), Helpman (2006), Spencer
(2005) and Helpman, Marin, Verdier (2008).
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struggle inside firms by the trade environment firms face. Trade liberalization
increases the costs of delegating power to the manager, since it matters more
for profits who runs the firm. In earlier work (Marin and Verdier (2007)) we
introduce firms’ organizational choices in a Dixit and Stiglitz model of mo-
nopolistic competition. However, in this model market size and trade have
no eect on corporate organization. As is typical for a model of monopolistic
competition of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type an increase in market size
leads to an increase in the number of varieties produced without aecting
the size of firms, markups and firm organization. In this paper we incorpo-
rate endogenous markups using the linear demand system as in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2007). Markups across firms respond now to the toughness of
competition in a market. This way our model exhibits a link between trade
liberalization, firm size and the mode of organizations firms choose.
In contrast to the present paper, we examine in Marin and Verdier (2003b)
how trade between dissimilar countries is aecting the corporate equilibrium
organization of the world economy. We introduce organizational choices in
a 2x2x2 Helpman and Krugman model of international trade in which coun-
tries dier in factor endowments. We find that relative factor endowments
are important determinants of the equilibrium mode of organization. We
find further that when two countries with dierent relative factor endow-
ments open up to trade, their factor prices will tend to converge and this
could induce a convergence in corporate cultures leading all principals in
both countries to delegate power (even when no principal in any of the two
countries was delegating in autarky). Surprisingly, as in MV (2003b) with
North-South trade between dissimilar countries, we find in the present paper
that managers’ empowerment and the move to flatter corporate hierarchies
emerge as an equilibrium when the world economy is governed by North-
North trade as well.
In Marin and Verdier (2008) we are reversing the question of this paper
by asking how corporate organization is aecting the nature of competition
rather than the other way around. We develop a theory in which orga-
nizational choices determine productivity dierences across business firms.
Rather than employing the customary assumption of an exogenous distribu-
tion of productivity as in Melitz (2003), heterogeneity in productivity arises
as a result of the endogenous allocation of power inside the corporation. The
model has several novel features. First, the intensity of competition depends
on whether headquarters or middle managers have power inside the corpo-
ration. Second, the model delivers new margins of trade adjustment: the
monitoring margin and the organizational margin. Depending on which of
7
these margins dominates, trade liberalization may lead to higher or lower
productivity.
The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 2 describes the
closed economy version of the model and studies the optimal choice of firm
organization. Section 3 derives the power struggle in firms as a function of
the toughness of competition in the market. The section then discusses the
industry equilibrium with free entry and derives the interaction between the
power struggle in firms and the equilibrium mode of organization. Section 4
opens the economy up to trade and studies the role of the size of nations in
determining the corporate equilibrium. Section 5 presents empirical evidence
supporting the view that trade and competition are explaining the allocation
of power in firms as well as the conflict of interests between principals/owners
and managers. Section 6 concludes. The proof of the main results and the
description of the data are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The closed economy
2.1 Demand
Consider an economy with O consumers. Consumer preferences are defined
over a continuum of dierentiated varieties indexed by l 5 l and a homoge-
nous good chosen as the numeraire. They are given by
X = t0 + 
Z
lMl
tlgl
1
2

Z
lMl
t2l gl
1
2

Z
lMl
tlgl
¸2
where t0 and tl are respectively consumption of the numeraire good and
of variety l of the dierentiated good. The demand parameters >  and 
are positive with  and  giving the substitution between the dierentiated
varieties and the numeraire good and  as the degree of product dierenti-
ation between varieties l=When  = 0, varieties are perfect substitutes and
consumers care only about the total consumption level over all varieties given
by
Tf =
Z
lMl
tlgl
Let sl be the price of variety l. We assume that consumers have positive
demand for the numeraire good. Then standard utility maximization gives
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the individual inverse demand function
sl =   tl  Tf
whenever tl A 0. This will be the case when
sl 
1
 + Q ( + Qs)
where Q is the measure of the set of varieties l with positive demand
and s the average price index given by
s = 1Q
Z
lMl
slgl
It follows that
s =   QT
f  Tf =    +QQ T
f
Total demand for variety l can be expressed as
tl = Otl =
O
 +Q 
O
 sl +
Q
 +Q
O
 s (1)
where tl is the market demand for variety l Note that in this linear demand
system for varieties, the price elasticity of demand is driven by the ’toughness’
of competition in the market induced either by a lower average price for
varieties s or more product varieties Q . The price elasticity of demand
increases with lower s and larger Q .
2.1.1 Production
The numeraire good 0 is produced with constant returns to scale (one unit
of good 0 requires one unit of labor) under perfect competitive conditions.
Each variety of the dierentiated good is produced under monopolistically
competitive conditions. Suppose that a given variety l is produced with
marginal cost fl> then profits for that variety can be written as
l = tl(sl  fl)
The profit maximizing output level tl = t(fl) and price level sl = s(fl) are
related to each other by:
tl = t(fl) =
O
 [s(fl) fl] (2)
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Note, that output per firm increases with the size of the market O.7
The profit maximizing price can be written as
s(fl) =
1
2

fl +

 +Q +
Q
 +Q s
¸
(3)
with the (absolute) markup over price as
p(fl) = s(fl) fl =
1
2
 
 +Q +
Q
 +Q s fl
¸
(4)
Note, that in addition to the taste for variety parameter  the markup is
now also determined by the toughness of competition in the market induced
either by a lower average price for varieties s or a larger number of varieties
Q .8
The average price s and average cost of firms f can be expressed as
s =
f+ +Q
2+Q
+Q
(5)
f = 1Q
Z
lMl
flgl (6)
and equilibrium profits of a firm with cost fl are given by
(fl) =
O
4 [fG  fl]
2 (7)
where fG is the cuto cost level
fG =
2
2 +Q +
Q
2 +Q f (8)
which is the cost level of a firm who is indierent between remaining or
leaving the industry. This firm earns zero profits as its price is driven down
to its marginal costs, s(fG) = fG= Firms with cost fl ? fG earn positive
profits. The cut o cost level fG captures the ’toughness’ of competition in an
industry. The cut o cost level fG declines and competition is tougher with
more firms around (with larger Q)> with more low cost firms in the market
(with lower f)> and when varieties are closer substitutes (with smaller )=9
7In the the Dixit and Stiglitz (DS) model output per firm does not depend on market
size. In the DS model a larger market increases the number of varities without changing
firm size.
8This stands in contrast to CES utility used in the DS model in which markups are
fixed and exclusively determined by the taste for variety parameter =
9see Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) for more details.
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2.1.2 Power in the Firm
In this section, we determine the optimal choice of firm organization. We
consider a firm with a simple hierarchy consisting of a CEO (the principal P)
hiring a division manager (the agent A) to implement a project. There are ex
ante p potential and a priory identical projects (or ways to produce a good).
Payos are ex ante unknown to both parties. To make things interesting we
assume that there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
Among the p projects, there is one which yields the highest possible benefit
E for the principal and one which yields the highest possible benefit e for the
agent.10 Let E be the principal’s expected benefit when the agent’s best
project is implemented with (0    1)=We assume, for simplicity, that the
agent’s expected benefit when the principal’s best project is implemented is
0=11  is a congruence parameter capturing the degree of conflict between
the principal and her agent. The lower , the more is the principal’s payo
reduced when the agent’s best project is implemented and hence the larger
the conflict of interest between the principal and her agent.
We turn now to the distinction between ”formal” and ”real power” in
the firm. E and e are supposed to be known ex ante though the parties
do not know ex ante which project yields such payo. We assume also that,
among thep projects, there are some with very high negative payos to both
parties, implying that choosing randomly a project without being informed
is not profitable to both agents who instead prefer to do nothing (project
0). This aspect, together with the fact that each uninformed party prefers to
rubber-stamp the other informed’s party suggestion to do nothing, implies
that private information about payos gives decision control to the informed
party. In this case, the informed party has ”real power” in the firm. There
are two sources of power in the firm. ”Formal power” which is allocated to
the manager by contract and ”real power” which parties may obtain by being
better informed.
Both parties may acquire information on possible ways to run the firm.
However, we assume that the CEO has managerial overload. By spending
some resource costs the principal learns the payos of all projects with prob-
ability H and remains uninformed with probability 1  H= This generates
10In the next section E is endogenized by the intensity of competition in product
markets.
11Alternatively, one can assume that the agent receives a benefit of e when the princi-
pal’s preferred project is implemented with (0    1). Here, to simplify exposition we
simply set  = 0=
11
costs of information collection of jS (H) = jH
2
2
. Similarly, by exerting some
eort jD(h) = nh with h 5 [0> h]> n ? e the agent learns the payo of all
projects with probability h and remains uninformed with probability 1  h.
We assume that the principal is risk neutral and that the agent is infinitely
risk averse with respect to income. Therefore, the agent is not responsive
to monetary incentives and he agrees to receive a fixed wage z equal to his
opportunity cost. His incentives to gather information on projects will be di-
rectly related to the private non pecuniary benefit e he gets from his ”best”
project.
Firms can choose between three types of organizations, a P-organization
in which the CEO/owner has formal power, an A-organization in which the
CEO delegates formal power to the agent, and an O-organization in which the
principal has formal power and in which the agent exerts minimum eort.
The O-organization can be thought of as a single managed firm (run by
the principal) without an internal hierarchy. The agent is employed but
is not doing anything useful, since the agent’s eort is assumed to be not
contractible.
We first compute the Nash equilibria in information collection and the re-
sulting payos under the three types of organization. Then we examine which
of these organizations yield higher utility to the principal and is preferred by
her.
P-Organization
Consider first the P-organization. Under the P-organization the principal
has formal power in the firm. The principal’s and the agent’s expected payos
are
XS (H> h) = HE + (1H)hE  jS (H) z
S (H> h) = (1H)he jD(h)
With probability H> the principal becomes fully informed about her pay-
os and picks her preferred project with monetary payo E, while the agent
receives 0= With probability 1 H, the principal remains uninformed about
payos. The agent may then learn with probability h and suggest his best
project to the principal (who accepts it). The principal receives a monetary
payo E while the agent gets his best private benefit e. In this case the
informed agent has real power in the firm. If none of the two agents find out
which is their preferred project, production does not take place (the other
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p 2 projects yield large negative payos). If both agents engage in infor-
mation collection, the decision rights reside in the principal (who has formal
power).
The first order conditions of the two parties with respect to eorts H and
h are
Principal : E(1 h) = jH (9)
Agent :
h = h if n  e(1H)
= 0 if n A e(1H) (10)
The conditions highlight the trade-o between the principal’s control and
the agent’s initiative. The principal supervises more the higher her stake
in the project (the larger E), the larger the conflict of interest between the
principal and the agent (the lower ) and the lower the agent’s eort h= The
agent, in turn, has more initiative the higher her stake (the larger e) and the
lower the principal’s interference (the lower H). Thus, control comes with
the cost of loosing the agent’s initiative.
The Nash equilibrium level of eorts under the P-organization are 12
hWS = h> and HWS =
E(1 h)
j when E 
eES ()
hWS = 0> and HWS =
E
j when E A
eES ()
with eES () = j(1 n@e)
1 heES () is the threshold level of profits at which the agent’s initiative is killed
under the P-organization. For E’s above the level eES (), the principal exerts
the eort HWS and kills the initiative of the agent. The equilibrium expected
utility of the principal under this organization is then:
xS (E) = XS (
E(1 h)
j > h)
12There are three possible Nash equilibria in eort levels. We select the equilibrium with
the highest agent’s eort which is also the one preferred by the principal. For a discussion
of the three Nash equilibria see Aghion and Tirole 1997.
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or
xS (E) =
E2(1 h)2
2j + hE  z (11)
O-Organization
Alternatively, whenever profits are su!ciently large (E A eES ())> the
Nash equilibrium level of eorts imply hWS = 0 and the agent does not actively
engage in the firm under the P-organization. We denote such an organization
as an ’O-organization’. The equilibrium expected utility of the principal in
the O-organization is
xR(E) = XS (
E
j > 0) =
E2
2j  z (12)
A-Organization
Consider now the A-organization. In this organization the principal del-
egates formal power to the agent. Now the principal is prevented from over-
ruling the agent’s decision when both have acquired information. The two
parties’ expected payos are then
XD(H> h) = hE + (1 h)HE  jS (H) z
yD(H> h) = he jD(h)
Now the agent chooses his preferred project when informed. Under this
organization the principal is prevented from overruling the agent’s decision
when both have acquired information. When the principal is informed and
the agent is uninformed, the principal suggests her best project, which is then
implemented by the agent. In this case the principal has real power in the
firm. With e A n, the Nash equilibrium eort levels under the A-organization
are13
hWD = h and HWD =
E(1 h)
j (13)
13When  A 0> we can show that there exists a threshold eED given by
eED = j(1 n@e)(1 h)
such that the agent’s initiative is killed under the A-organization when E A eED. Intu-
itively, above the threshold level eED the principal’s stakes are so high that she acquires
information HD leading to a high probability of intervention which, in equilibrium, leads
to minimum agent’s eort hD = 0 .
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The advantage of delegating formal power to the agent is that the agent
has more initiative to become informed. In our specification, the agent
will always provide maximum eort under the A-organization while his ini-
tiative will be killed under the P-organization for profits of the principal
large enough. The equilibrium expected utility of the principal under the
A-organization is
xD(E) = XD(
E(1 h)
j > h) =
E2(1 h)2
2j + hE  z (14)
The Choice of Firm Organization
We turn now to determine the optimal firm organization. We now ask how
the parties’ informational eorts respond to exogenous changes in the payo
E under the P-organization and under the A-organization, respectively.14 We
solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in eort levels HW> hW under each
mode of organization when profits gradually increase.
Two cases can be distinguished.
Case 1: E  eES ()
At this profit level both firm organizations keep the agent’s initiative alive.
The utility levels of the principal under the two forms of organization
are simply
xS (E) =
E2(1 h)2
2j +hEz and xD(E) =
E2(1 h)2
2j +hEz
Given that hWS = hWD = h> and that HWS A HWD in this regime, it follows
that xS (E) A xD(E). Thus, the P-organization yields higher utility to the
principal.
Case 2: eES () ? E
At this profit level, the P-organization kills the agent’s eort hWS = 0, while
he exerts maximal eort hWD = h under the A-organization. The principal’s
expected utilities under the two organizations, respectively are given by
xR(E) =
E2
2j  z and xD(E) =
(1 h)2E2
2j + hE  z
14We endogenize E by product market competition in the next section.
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xR(E) A xD(E) and thus the principal prefers the O-firm over the A-firm
when
E A E() = 2j
2 h
E() is the threshold level of profits at which the principal is indier-
ent between loosing control while keeping the agent’s initiative as in the
A-organization and keeping control but loosing the agent’s initiative as in
the O-organization. When E A E¯()> the principal prefers to exert control
and to loose the agent’s initiative and she opts for the O-organization.
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For E() ? eES () the P-organization yields higher utility
to the principal than the A-organization for all values of E=
For eES () ? E(), three organizations may emerge as profits gradually
increase.
- For E  eES ()> the principal prefers the P-firm over the A-firm with
hWS = h and HWS = E(13h)j ;
- For eES () ? E ? E()> the A-firm yields higher utility to the principal
than the P-firm with hWD = h and HWD = E(13h)j ;
- For E()  E> the O-firm yields higher utility to the principal than the
A-firm with hWS = 0 and HWS = Ej =
Intuitively, the mode of organization matters for incentives inside the firm
at intermediate levels of profits only. At low and high profit levels there is
no trade-o between control and initiative. At low profit levels, the principal
monitors and intervenes little because her stakes are small and she cares little.
Therefore, the P-organization gives su!cient initiative to the agent. At high
profit levels, the principal’s stakes are so large that she intervenes even under
the A-organization leading to minimum eort by the agent even when he is
given formal power in the firm. Therefore, the principal might as well keep
control by choosing the O-organization. At intermediate levels of profits there
is a trade-o between control and initiative and the principal delegates formal
power to her agent to keep his initiative and the A-organization emerges as
the optimal mode of organization.
The firm’s optimal choice of organization is illustrated in Figure 2. The
E˜S () - curve captures the cost of having control in the firm in terms of the
loss of the agent’s initiative. The E¯()- curve captures the gain of having
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control in terms of the firm’s/principal’s profits. From Proposition 1 we know
that for profit levels below the E˜S () curve the benefit of control outweighs
its costs and the firm chooses the P-organization. In fact, at these levels of
profits there are no costs of control, since the agent’s initiative can be kept
alive under the P-organization. For profit levels in between the E˜S ()- and
the E¯()- curve, the cost of control outweighs the benefit and the firm goes
for the A-organization. For profit levels above the E¯()- curve, the benefit
of control again outweighs its costs and the firm chooses the O-organization.
2
3 Market Competition and Power Struggle
We incorporate now the choice of firm organization into the production side
described in section 2. We endogenize profits E and the power struggle in
firms  in this section. Recall the distinction between formal and real power
in the firm. Consider two types of firms depending on who has real (as
opposed to formal) power in the organization. Firms in which the principals’
preferred project is implemented produce the good with production cost fl =
fE= Call these firms ”real P-firms”. Similarly firms in which the agent’s
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preferred project is implemented produce the good with production cost fl =
fe = *fE and * A 1. Call these firms ”real A-firms”. The idea here is that
the agent does not always choose the cost minimizing project but rather one
that is best for him and maximizes his perks. Thus, even in a ’formal P-firm’
in which the principal keeps formal control, the agent’s preferred high cost
project may get implemented. This will happen when the principal decides
not to get informed and to rubber stamp the agent’s suggestion. This is a
’real A-firm’ in a formal P-firm equilibrium.
From (7) we can rewrite the principal’s profits when her best project is
implemented as
E = (fE) =
O
4 [fG  fE]
2 =
Of2E
4 [efG  1]2 with efG = fGfE (15)
efG is the cost gap between firms with zero profits fG and the low cost
P-firms fE= The smaller this gap the harder it is to earn positive profits in
the market. Thus, efG reflects the toughness of competition that a firm faces.
The conflict of interest between the principal and her agent  can also be
expressed as a function of the cost gap efG
 = (fe)(fE)
=
efG  *efG  1
¸2
(16)
The power struggle in firms becomes more intense ( becomes smaller)
with a decline in relative profits between an A-firm (fe) in which the agent
runs the firm and a P-firm (fE) in which the principal has power in the
firm. Relative profits between these two types of firms decline with tougher
competition (with smaller efG)> because high-cost A-firms’ revenues go down
by more than revenues of low-cost P-firms. A-firms try to fight the loss in
revenues by lowering mark-ups by more than P-firms. With more intense
competition, it matters more who runs the firm and delegation of power to
the agent becomes more costly to firms.
To see this we express prices, output, mark-ups, and revenues of P-firms
and A-firms, respectively as a function of efG=
tE = t(fE) = O fE
efG  1
2 while te = t(fe) = O fE
efG  *
2
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sE = s(fE) = fE
efG + 1
2
while se = s(fe) = fE
efG + *
2
uE = u(fE) =
Of2E
4
¡ef2G  1¢ while ue = u(fe) = Of2E4 ¡ef2G  *2¢
E = (fE) =
Of2E
4 [efG  1]2 while e = (fe) = Of
2
E
4 [efG  *]2
pE = p(fE) = fE
efG  1
2
>
pe = p(fe) = fE
efG  *
2
=
Low cost P-firms set lower prices sE> produce larger outputs tE, and earn
larger revenues uE> and profits E than high-cost A-firms ( se> te> ue> e)= They
also set larger mark-ups over price pE compared to A-firms pe=
The two relationships (15) and (16) describe how efG, jointly aects profits
and the power struggle in firms. Eliminating efG> they define a relationship
between E and  that has to be satisfied by any firm. From (15) we get
efG = 1 + 2fE
r

O
s
E
and from (16) we have
efG = *s
1s
Therefore, the relationship between E and  is given by
E = bE() =  * 1
1s
¸2 O

f2E
4
(17)
The construction of the bE(=) curve is described in Figure 3. The curve (SS )
in quadrant I plots equation (11) and shows how the firm’s profits E vary
with efG (relationship 15)). The curve is positively sloped, because when efG
declines and competition becomes tougher, profits decline as revenues and
markups become smaller. The curve () in quadrant II plots equation (12)
and shows how efG aects the conflict of interest inside firms  (relationship
(16)). The curve is positively sloped, because when efG declines and compe-
tition becomes tougher delegating power to the agent becomes more costly
to firms and hence the conflict of interest in firms rises ( becomes smaller).
Quadrant III plots the 450-line making sure that the two curves () and
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(SS ) are drawn for the same value of efG. Then the bE(=) curve is obtained
in quadrant IV which shows how  aects profits E= The curve is positively
sloped, because with an increase in efG and  competition and the power
struggle in firms decline and firms earn higher profits. A given value of 
in quadrant IV is associated with a value of efG in quadrant II which results
in a level of profits E in quadrant I, generating a point P on curve bE(=) in
quadrant IV.
The appendix shows that bE(=) satisfies bE(0) A 0 and bE(1) = +4 and
is positively sloped in the space (E>). A downward move along bE(=) is
associated with an increase in market competition (a decrease in efG).
3.1 Industry Equilibrium with Free Entry
We derive now the industry equilibrium in which the free entry conditions
have to be fulfilled for a given choice of firm organization. The timing of
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events is as follows. In a first stage, firms decide whether or not to enter
the market and to hire an agent to monitor projects. At this stage, there
is free entry. In a second stage, firms decide who has formal power in the
organization by choosing between the formal P-firm and the formal A-firm.
In a third stage, information collection eorts are realized by the two parties
and a project is selected. This, in turn, determines who has real power in
the organization. Finally there is production, consumption and factor market
clearing.
The free entry conditions for a given choice of firm organization can be
written asPd{{xS (E)> xD(E)> xR(E)} = 0= The ”Max” argument in the free
entry conditions reflects the fact that each firm decides about its optimal type
after market entry. For simplicity, we normalize z = 1. Three types of free
entry equilibria are possible:
i) Equilibrium with P-organization and hWS = h
The free entry condition in such a regime is
xS (E) =
E2(1 h)2
2j + hE  1 = 0 (18)
This gives a unique positive solution ES = EWS () which is the free
entry profit level that firms require to enter the market with a formal P-
organization. Obviously, an equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if
EWS ()  eES ()
ii) Equilibrium with A-organization and hWD = h.
The free entry condition in such a regime is
xD(E) =
E2(1 h)2
2j + hE  1 = 0 (19)
The free entry condition gives a unique positive solution ED = EWD()=
An equilibrium in this regime exists if and only if eES ()  EWD() ? E()=
iii) Equilibrium with O-organization and hWS = 0
Finally the free entry condition in this regime is
xR(E) = j
E2
2
 1 = 0 (20)
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which gives the solution ES =
s
2j. Such an equilibrium exists whens
2j A E()=
Next, we analyze how firms’ incentives to enter the market are aected
by the anticipated power struggle in firms. In terms of the model, we look
at how the equilibrium conditions for free entry for P-firms, A-firms, and
O-firms, respectively are aected by changes in . We do this with the help
of Figure 4. Recall that the curves EWS () and EWD() are the free entry profit
levels that a firm requires to enter the market as a P-firm and as an A-
firm, respectively. Both curves slope down with , since both firms revenues
increase with  and thus firms require a lower profit to enter the market.
The EWD() curve lies above the EWS () curve, since for any given > firms
with an A-organization anticipate that their profits will be reduced when the
agent has power in the firm. Hence, A-firms require a larger profit to enter
the market. When preferences between principals and agents are perfectly
congruent (when  = 1) , there is no conflict of interest and the organization
of the firm stops to matter for market entry. Both types of firms will choose
the same cost minimizing project (at  = 1 the two curves collapse to the
same required profit value EWD() = EWS ()).
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3.2 Free Entry Corporate Equilibrium
Consider now the structure of organizational equilibria with free entry which
are determined in Figure 5. The figure combines the profit maximizing choice
of organization of Figure 2 and the free entry conditions of Figure 4 to analyze
the equilibrium mode of organization under free entry. The two curves E˜S ()
andE() fromFigure 2 determining the optimal firm organization are plotted
as well as the two curves EWS () and EWD() from Figure 4 describing the free
entry profit levels for P-firms with agent’s eort (i.e. h = h) and for A-firms.
In addition, the horizontal line EW0 =
s
2j is giving the free entry profit level
for O-firms.
The bold line in Figure 5 describes the nature of the free entry corporate
equilibria as a function of the power struggle in firms . Several points are
worth noticing. First, at  = 1> the mode of organization stops to matter. At
this value of , preferences of principals and managers are perfectly congruent
and there is no conflict in the firm. Second, with a decrease in , the equilib-
rium firm organization moves from the central P-organization with power at
the top of the organization to the decentralized A-organization with power
delegated to the manager and finally to the single managed O-organization.
Typically, with a decrease in , the stakes rise and firms require a larger level
of profit EW to enter the market under both organizations. As the conflict
of interest in firms rise, principals start to monitor. Initially, for large val-
ues of  in the range of [S > 1], the firms’ free entry stakes EW are no too
high. Therefore, firms’ monitoring does not kill the initiative of agents even
under the P-organization. Hence, firms choose the latter. However, when
 goes down and the power struggle in firms increases, the required stakes
to enter the market are high enough to kill the initiative of agents under
the P-organization but not under the A-organization. There is a trade-o
between control and initiative. The A-organization emerges as a corporate
equilibrium for values of  in [0> D]).Finally, as  decreases further (i.e
for values of  smaller than 0), the required profit level for market entry
increases further until the stakes for firms become so high that firms favor
control and loose the initiative of managers and the O-firm emerges as the
equilibrium organization.
Statement 1: When the power struggle in firms increases, the corporate
equilibrium organization moves from the central P-organization to the decen-
tralized A-organization to the single managed O-organization.
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3.3 Corporate Equilibrium and Competition
We are finally ready to describe the corporate equilibrium organization. This
is done in Figure 6 which explores how the free entry organizational equilibria
we have just derived in the previous section interact with the toughness of
competition and the power struggle in firms. TheEWEW curve (derived in Fig-
ure 5) determines free entry profits and the profit maximizing choice of firm
organization. The E = bE() curve (derived in Figure 4) determines profits,
the toughness of competition in the market as well as the power struggle in
firms. An equilibrium H =(Eh> h) is defined by an intersection point of the
two curves. Since EWEW is downward sloping in  and bE() is increasing in
> we show in the appendix that such an organizational equilibrium (Eh> h)
always exists. The model is then solved recursively. Once the equilibrium
values of Eh and h and an equilibrium organizational regime l 5 {S>D>R}
are obtained, one can derive the corresponding threshold cost eflG in quadrant
II of Figure 6. Similarly, the equilibrium level of monitoring by firms Hl
is obtained, from which we then compute the equilibrium average costs fl>
the equilibrium number of eective firms Ql, the number of entering firms
Pl = Ql@(Hl + (1  Hl)h) and output, revenues and mark-up levels of low
costs P-firms and high costs A-firms. Finally, the labor market equilibrium
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gives the output level of the numeraire good 0=
Figure 6: Corporate Equilibrium and Competition
4 Market Size and Corporate Equilibrium
Consider now the comparative statics associated with a change in market size
O. A change in market size aects profits and the toughness of competition
between firms. This, in turn, aects the power struggle in firms and the
optimal firm organization.
The eect of a change in market size O is illustrated in Figure 7. We know
from (15) that a larger market increases firms’ profits as output per firm and
revenues increase. This is reflected by an upward shift of the (PP) curve
in quadrant I of Figure 7. At the same time a change in O does not aect
the conflict curve () in quadrant II. Given that profits of high costs and
low costs firms are both directly proportional to market size, a change in O
has no direct eect on the conflict of interest , everything else being equal.
Thus, an increase in O shifts up the curve bE() in quadrant IV of Figure 7.
Note also that the free entry curve EWEW is not aected by a change in O
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As a consequence, market size aects the equilibrium organization of
firms. An increase in O makes the equilibrium point H (intersection of bE()
and EWEW) move along EWEW upward from a P-equilibrium with power at
the top of the organization to an A-equilibrium with power delegated to the
divisional level, to finally a single managed O-equilibrium regime without
internal hierarchies. Note also that with an increase in market size,  is
moving leftward along the EWEW curve. Hence, the conflict of interest in
the firm increases with an increase in O. Finally, in quadrant II of Figure
7, an increase in O is increasing the toughness of competition in the market
(decreases efG)
7
Intuitively, an increase in market size increases firms’ outputs and prof-
its, inducing firm entry, tougher competition and smaller markups. With
increased competition delegation of power becomes more costly which tends
to increase the power struggle between principals and middle managers (lower
)= A larger conflict of interest in firms and bigger profits, in turn stimulate
monitoring by principals (increased eort H), making it more likely that the
initiative of agents is crowded out under a central P-organization. Initially,
when the market is small, profits and the conflict of interest in firms is small.
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Therefore, principals in firms monitor only little and do not kill the initiative
of agents under the P-organization. There is no trade-o between control and
initiative. Hence, firms choose the latter. However, when market size keeps
increasing and takes intermediate levels, profits, competition and the conflict
in firms become su!ciently large to kill the initiative of agents under the P-
organization. There is a trade-o between control and initiative. Principals
delegate power to agents to keep the initiative alive and the A-organization
emerges as a free entry corporate equilibrium. When market size keeps in-
creasing further profits, competition, and the power struggle in firms become
so large that principals in firms prefer control no matter what. There is again
no trade-o between control and initiative and the single managed O-firm
without agents’ eort emerges as the equilibrium organization.
Note that when the market is neither too small nor too large there is
more than one equilibrium mode of organization. One equilibrium is the
P-organization with high agents’ eort and another is the A-organization.
These multiple equilibria arise due to a ”strategic complementarity” among
firms at the decision stage of optimal firm organization. At an intermediate
level of market size the attractiveness between the two modes of organization
depends on the organizational decisions taken by other firms in the market.
Each firm individually would choose the A-organization at this size of the
market, since in between the curves E˜S () and E() the A-organization is
optimal. However, when the firm anticipates at this stage that all the other
firms will choose the P-organization, then, she also anticipates that it will
be hard to survive competition with a formal A-organization and hence she
chooses a P-organization as well. Similarly, when firms anticipate that all
the other firms will choose the A-organization, then they expects to be viable
competitors in the market with an A-organization. The multiplicity of orga-
nizational equilibria arises due to a coordination problem among firms which
comes from the fact that firms’ choice of organization aects the toughness of
competition in the market.15
Moreover, when the organizational equilibrium shifts from P to A with an
increase in market size, the power struggle between principals and managers
may decline rather than increase. In fact, in an A-organizational equilibrium,
firms have on average higher costs of production than in a P-equilibrium.
Agents are more likely to have real power in firms in an A-equilibrium and to
implement their best ”high cost” project. This in turn reduces the toughness
of competition in the economy and hence reduces the conflict of interest in
15We explore how the firms’ choice of organization aects the nature of competition in
Marin and Verdier (2008).
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firms. This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows how  is aected by a
change in O. For low values of O> a P-organizational equilibrium prevails and
an increase in market size tends to reduce the value of  within that regime.
When O becomes big enough, an A-equilibrium becomes feasible and the
conflict in firms declines as  jumps upwards to a higher value. A further
increase in O in the A-regime again toughens competition and increases the
conflict in firms ( continues to decline). Finally, when O is increasing even
further, the O-firm emerges as the new equilibrium and  keeps declining16.
This discussion can be summarized in the following statement:
Statement 2: When the size of the market increases, the corporate equilib-
rium moves from the central P-organization to the decentralized A-organization
and finally to the single managed O-firm. Within each organizational regime
(P, A or O), the conflict of interest between principals and managers in-
creases with market size. A shift in the organizational regime from P to A
at first reduces the power struggle in firms.
8
16Though it is eectively irrelevant, as in that regime, the agent never has ”real power”
(his initiative is killed).
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5 Empirical Evidence
In this section we use unique survey data of 660 global corporations in Austria
(200) and Germany (460) to test the predictions of our theory. We first derive
the predictions from the theory. We then examine the relationship between
the allocation of power in firms and international trade. Finally, we study the
relationship between the power struggle in firms and the trade environment.
As predicted by the theory, we show that the level of decision making as well
as the power struggle in Austrian and German corporations can be explained
by market size and competition.
5.1 Predictions
We start by examining the relationship between international trade and firms’
mode of organization. An increase in trade is captured in our model by an in-
crease in market size O. From Figure 7 we can derive this relationship. Recall
that an increase in market size O shifts up the bE() curve along the EWEW-
curve in quadrant IV. Hence, with an increase in O competition becomes
more intense (efG declines) and the economy moves from a P-equilibrium
with power at the CEO level to an A-equilibrium with power delegated to
middle managers, to finally a single managed O-firm. Thus, we have
Prediction 1: In a cross section of firms, firms will have more decentral-
ized corporate hierarchies and face tougher competition in larger countries.
Next, we study the relationship between trade shares and firms’ mode of
organization. Smaller economies will import more varieties from the foreign
larger economy as home consumers want to consume all varieties produced
in the world economy. Hence, smaller countries will have larger trade shares
than larger economies.17 As the number of varieties supplied by foreign firms
increases in response to trade liberalizations smaller countries will experience
a larger movement down along the bE()- curve in Figure 7 compared to larger
countries. This corresponds to an increase in the toughness of competition
(along bE() efG declines). Hence, in smaller economies it becomes more
likely that the corporate equilibrium shifts from a central O-organization to
a decentralized A-organization in response to trade liberalizations. Thus, we
have
17For the relationship between trade shares and country size, see Helpman and Krugman
(1985).
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Prediction 2: In a cross section of firms, organizational change towards
less hierarchical organizations is more likely to happen in firms in smaller
countries.
Finally, we examine the relationship between trade and the power struggle
in firms. We can derive this relationship from Figure 7 and Figure 8. In
Figure 7 an increase in O shifts up the bE() curve moving  leftward along the
EWEWcurve in quadrant IV. As a result, the power struggle in firms increases
with an increase in O= Hence, we have
Prediction 3: In a cross section of firms, the power struggle between
CEOs/owners and managers in firms will be more intense in larger more
competitive countries.
5.2 Specification
We start by examining the relationship between the power allocation in firms
and trade. In order to test Prediction 1 we report estimates from regressions
of the form
ln(srzhu)lm = 1+2(frps)lm+3qdwlrq+4(qdwlrqfrpslm)+4 ln(#vhjp)lm+ 5lm
(21)
where l denotes firm and m denotes country. srzhulm indicates whether
headquarters or middle managers have power in the corporation. It is the
mean of a ranking between 1 (centralized) and 5 (decentralized) of corpo-
rate decisions depending on whether the CEO/owner or the divisional man-
ager in the firm take the decision. frpslm is a measure of competition with
yhu|pdq|, pdq|, or ihz when firms face very many, many or few competi-
tors, respectively. qdwlrq is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the large
country Germany and zero for Austria. In light of Prediction 1, we test for
the hypotheses 2 A 0 and 3 A 0 that firms decentralize decision power
in the corporation in more competitive environments compared to when the
firm faces no competitor. In particular, we test for the hypothesis 4 A 0
that country size magnifies the eect of competition on the power allocation
in firms.18 Finally, we control for firm size by including the number of busi-
ness segments in firms (#vhjp)lm to account for the possibility that larger
18This follows directly from Figure 7 where larger countries have tougher competition
and hence have steeper bE()- curves than smaller countries. The appendix derives the
properties of the bE()- curve as a function of country size O and the the level of conflict
=
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more diversified firms are more likely to delegate power to lower levels of the
corporation. 5lmis an error term.
Next, we examine organizational change as stated in Prediction 2. We
estimate an equation with the following specification
djhlm = C1 + C2(frpsi)lm + C3(qdwlrq) + C4(qdwlrq  frpsilm) + lm (22)
where djhlm is an indicator for organizational change. It is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 and zero otherwise when firms have been using the
current organization less than four years. frpsilm is a measure of competition
with yhu|pdq|, pdq|, or ihz when firms face very many, many or few
foreign competitors, respectively. In light of Prediction 2, we test for C4 ? 0
that firms exposed to more foreign competition and located in the smaller
country are more likely to introduce organizational change. lm is an error
term.
Finally, we examine the power struggle in firms  as stated in Prediction
3. We run a regression with the following specification
frqiolfwlm = 1+2(frps)lm+3(qdwlrqfrpslm)+4(qdwlrq)+5 ln(#vhjp)lm+lm
(23)
where frqiolfwlm is a measure of the "power struggle" in firms. frqiolfwlm
denotes the number of links between business segments in corporations. It is
a dummy variable taking the value 1 and zero otherwise when there is no link
between business segments. We assume that the conflict of interest in firms
is large when there is no link between business segments and declines with
the number of links. The dummy variable is constructed from the variable
frqiolfw which ranges from 1 (perfect link) to 5 (no link), see the data section
for more details. The idea is that in corporations with little links between
business segments middle managers of divisions will have diverting interests
from the rest of the firm. With little links to the firm, middle managers are
likely to pursue their own goals without depending on the cooperation of the
rest of the firm. Hence, in such firms it is likely that congruence between
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CEO/owners and middle managers is low.19 In light of Prediction 3 we test
for 2 A 0 and 4 A 0, that when the market environment becomes more
unfriendly it is more likely that the conflict of interests between dierent
layers of management increases. We also include (qdwlrq frpslm) to test for
3 A 0 that country size makes this eect stronger. Finally, we control for the
number of business segments (#vhjp)lm to account for the possibility that
the presence or absence of links between business segments in the corporation
will depend on how diversified the firm is.
5.3 The Data
We conducted a survey of 660 global corporations in Austria (200 firms)
and in Germany (460 firms) in the period 1997-2001. Due to the length of
the questionnaire, we personally visited the firms in Austria and Germany,
respectively or conducted the interviews by phone. The data include all pub-
licly traded German DAX firms. The data consist of the organizational part
of a full population survey of global corporations in Austria and Germany
investing in Eastern Europe. The firms included in the sample are global
corporations in the sense that they at least have two subsidiaries outside
Austria and Germany, respectively. The organizational data of the sample
are unique in several dimensions. They include detailed information on the
internal organization of the corporations such as power relations between the
CEO and the divisional level, organizational form, incentive system used for
its workers, wages and educational qualifications of the firm’s workers, de-
tailed data on the financial structure as well as balance sheet information.
Table A3 of the data appendix gives summary statistics of all the variables
used in this paper.20
The left-hand side variable srzhulm of equation (21) is obtained from the
19The use of frqiolfw as a proxy for the power struggle between CEO/owners and
middle managers (the level of congruence in the language of Aghion and Tirole 1997) has
been inspired by the corporate finance literature on the one hand and the literature on
social networks on the other which both emphasize links and contacts in organizations.
The corporate finance literature sees the ’diversification discount’ as an expression of an
ine!ciency arising in conglomerates with too little links between dierent divisions of
the corporation, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) for a review and Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales (2000) for an explanation. The literature on social networks views social capital as
bridges across ’structural holes’, see Burt (2002), for the concept of social embeddedness,
see Granovetter (1973).
20For more information on the data see Marin (2006).
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question ’Who decides over the following issues concerning your corporation,
headquarters or the divisional manager, please rank between 1 (centralized
decision taken at the headquarters) and 5 (decentralized decision taken at
the divisional level)?’ The survey then lists 16 (Germany) and 13 (Austria)
corporate decisions which are ranked by headquarters of the corporation
including the decisions over acquisitions, financial decisions, the decision over
a new strategy, transfer pricing, the decision to introduce a new product, the
decision over R&D expenditures, the decision over the budget, the decision
over product price, over a wage increase, the decision of firing of personnel,
and the decision to hire a secretary.21 Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix give
a complete list of the ranking of these decisions in the corporate hierarchy.
The variable srzhu is the mean over the 16 (13) corporate decisions ranking
for an individual firm ranging between 1 and 5. A firm with a mean of
1 has all 16(13) decisions centrally organized with power at the top of the
organization and a firm with a mean of 5 has these decisions decentralized
to middle managers at the divisional level. As can be seen from Tables A1
and A2 the corporate decisions exhibit a robust ranking in the two countries.
The decision over acquisitions and the financial decision tend to be taken at
the top of the corporation in both countries, while the decision over R&D
expenditures and the decision to introduce a new product tend to be taken
together between the headquarters and middle managers.
The left hand side variable djhlmof equation (22) is obtained from the
question ’How many years have you been using the current organization?’
djhlm is transformed to a dummy variable with value 1 when firms have been
using the current organization less than four years.
The left hand side variable frqiolfwlm of equation (23) is obtained from the
question ’What links exist between the business segments of your corporation
- a technical link (input-output relationship between segments), a financial
link (cash flow of one segment finances an other segment), an economic link
(similar market knowledge between product lines of dierent divisions)?’ The
variable frqiolfw is ranked between 1 (perfect link) and 5 (no link). The link
is perfect (1) when the firm has only one business segment, (2) when the
business segments in the firm have a technical, financial as well as economic
link, (3) when only two out of the three links are present, (4) when only one
out of the three links are present, and (5) when none of these links exists.
The variable used in equation (23) is transformed to a dummy variable with
21In some cases these decisions in the corporation were ranked by the divisional manager,
when the firm is a very large conglomerate. In this cases the interview was conducted at
the divisional level.
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value 1 when there is no link between segments and zero when at least one
link exists between business segments.
The right hand variable frpslm and frpsilm are subjective measures of
domestic and foreign competition as perceived by firms. They are obtained
from the question ’Howmany competitors do you face on your local (Austrian
or German) market and worldwide, respectively?’ Firms tend to face many
(269) or few (253) competitors (out of 630 firms) on local markets, while they
face many (447) and few (112) foreign competitors. No firm is a monopolist
either locally or worldwide, while some firms did not find it profitable to enter
the local market (76 firms) or world markets (48 firms). Since many of these
firms are multi product firms, the subjective measure of competition is an
average description over the firms’ product range. The measure of firm size
#vhjp is obtained from the question ’How many business segments do you
have in the corporation?’ In the survey we followed the firms’ own definition
of a business segment. This implies that the level of aggregation of what
constitutes a business segment varies across firms. In the sample the number
of business segments varied between 0 (e.g. for a holding company without
a production unit) and 14 segments.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 The Allocation of Power
Our main findings are given in Table 4 which presents ordinary least squares
estimates of equation (21). All t-values are computed allowing for het-
eroskedasticity at the firm level. Furthermore, all regressions include a set of
industry dummies. The omitted category for competition is ’no competitor’.
In columns 1, 2 and 5 we focus on local competition. We first include frps
and the country dummy qdwlrq separately to test for 2 A 0 and 3 A 0=
We also include #vhjp to control for firm size as well as for the fact that
the variable frps reflects an average of the competitive conditions over the
product range of multiproduct firms. We also include a range of additional
firm-level controls to check whether the correlations we report are driven
by omitted variables. The additional firm-level covariates are: the log of
output per worker and the fraction of employees with an academic degree.
Firms that are more skill intensive and more productive appear significantly
more likely to be decentralized. The estimated coe!cients on frps and on
qdwlrq are not statistically significant and #vhjp is significant and positive
suggesting that more diversified firms tend to decentralize power. We then
interact frps with qdwlrq to examine whether the eect of competition
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on the decision to decentralize power in corporations is magnified in larger
markets. We indeed find this. The coe!cient on frpsqdwlrq is now highly
significant and positive for very many competitors. Moreover, frps alone be-
comes now significant and negative for very many competitors. This suggests
that firms decentralize power only when faced with both a larger market as
well as tougher competition. However, they tend to remain centralized when
competition intensifies without an increase in market size.22 The size of the
estimated coe!cient on frps  qdwlrq is 0.64 increasing the average rank
of corporate decisions by 23 percent from 2.81 to 3.45 (see Tables A1, A2,
A3) This indicates that in large markets competition has a quantitative
important eect on firms’ decision to decentralize power.23
In column 5 we focus on the two corporate decisions for which the em-
powerment of middle managers matters most, the decision over R&D and the
decision to introduce a new product. We indeed find that firms in the larger
market respond with more decentralization of these decisions in response to
tougher competition. Note also, that the marginal eects of frpsqdwlrq are
more than twice as large in the R&D decisions sample as in the all corporate
decisions sample.
In columns 3, 4 and 6 we turn to foreign competition to test Prediction
2. Consistent with our theory we find that frpsi is positive and highly
significant and frpsi  qdwlrq is negative and highly significant for many
and very many competitors when we interact frpsi with qdwlrq in column
4. Overall, the results of Table 4 give support to Prediction 1 and Prediction
2 that firms in larger more competitive markets and firms more exposed to
trade tend to have more decentralized corporate hierarchies.
22Note, that an increase in the intensity of competition without an increase in market
size is a movement down along the bE()-curve in Figure 8, while an increase in market
size with an increase in competition shifts the same curve to the left upwards.
23Using an elaborate measure of management practices for the US, UK, Germany, and
France, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) also find that competition is a driving force behind
the quality of management in corporations. Poor management practices tend to be more
prevalent when product market competition is weak.
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5.4.2 Organizational Change
Table 5 reports probit maximum likelihood estimates of equation (22). All
z-values are computed allowing for heteroskedasticity at the firm level. Fur-
thermore, all regressions include a set of industry dummies. We also include
additional firm-level controls to avoid omitted variable bias. The additional
firm-level covariates are the log of output per worker, the fraction of workers
with an academic degree and the log of capital stock divided by sales. In
column 1 we interact frpsiwith qdwlrq to test for C4 and we include #vhjp
to control for the fact that firm size may influence the speed of organizational
change. We find that frpsi  qdwlrq is negative and significant suggesting
that a stronger exposure to international competition is more conducive to
organizational change in the smaller country. In column 2 we proceed to lo-
cal competition to examine whether the competitive conditions on the local
market exhibit a similar eect on the decision to introduce organizational
change. We do find this. Local competition is positive and highly significant
suggesting that in more competitive environments firms tend to have younger
organizations. Frps  qdwlrq turns out negative and significant which may
suggest that it proxies for frpsi qdwlrq=Therefore, we rerun the regression
to include frps, frpsi as well as frpsi  qdwlrq. In this specification,
given in column 3, frps stops to have a significant influence on the speed of
organizational change. The findings of Table 5 give support to Prediction 2
that firms in the smaller country more exposed to international competition
are more likely to introduce organizational change.
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5.4.3 The Level of Conflict in Corporations.
Table 6 reports Probit maximum likelihood estimates of equation (23). All
z-values are corrected for heteroskedasticity at the firm level. All regressions
are estimated with a set of industry dummies. We include the log of output
per worker as an additional control to avoid omitted variable bias. It is likely
that the number of links between business segments (’synergies’) and labour
productivity are correlated. The results are consistent with Prediction 3 - all
key variables take the expected signs and are statistically significant at the
1 percent level. Column 1 and 4 examine whether competition and market
size have each separately made it more likely that middle managers pursue
their own interests rather than that of the firm. We find that firms are
more likely to have no link between business segments in larger markets and
when faced with more local as well as foreign competitors. We then interact
competition with market size in columns 2 and 3 (local competition) and in
columns 5 and 6 (foreign competition) to test for C3 A 0= The interaction
of frpshwlwlrq with qdwlrq only marginally provides additional information
when frpshwlwlrq is included as a covariate in the regressions (columns 2
and 5), while it does so when combined with qdwlrq (columns 3 and 6).24
24We have also run ordered probit estimates which emphasize the number of links be-
tween business segments rather than whether there is a link at all with similar but somehow
weaker results in particular for the case of local competition. Furthermore, we calculated
probit estimates for the technical, financial, and economic link each separately with sim-
ilar results. Apparently, it is not the number or type of links that seems to matter, but
whether there is a link at all. The estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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6 Conclusion
Can dierences in countries exposure to trade account for the observed dier-
ences in corporate organization across countries and firms? Can an increased
integration into the world economy explain the trend towards less hierarchical
organizations in rich countries? We have developed a model that combines
the Krugman cum Melitz and Ottaviano model of trade with the Aghion and
Tirole theory of the firm to answer these questions raised in the introduc-
tion. Our model traces a link between the size of nations, competition and
corporate organization which can account for the facts identified in the in-
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troduction. We derive predictions from our model which we test with unique
firm level survey data for two countries.
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Appendix B
• Existence of (Eh> h) equilibrium with free entry:
• Lemma 1: At all values  ? 1 such that bE() = eES () we have thatbE0() A eE0S ().
Proof: We have
eE0S () = j(1 n@e)
(1 h)2
h and bE0() = (* 1)
(1s)3
2O

f2E
4
1s
At a value of  such that bE() = eES (), we have
j(1 n@e)
(1 h) =
(* 1)
(1s)2
2O

f2E
4
therefore at such a point:
bE0()eE0S () =
1 h
h
1
(1s)s =
1 h
h(s ) A 1
as 1 h A h(s ) is equivalent to 1 A hs which is valid as h ? 1
and  ? 1.
Lemma 1 says that when curve bE() crosses curve eES (), it has to cross
it from below. It also means that there is at most one point  ? 1 such thatbE() = eES ()=
Consider then the following
Assumption B :
p
2j A (* 1)2 O
f2E
4
which says that the cost dierential * 1 between "high cost" and "low
cost" firms is not too high (or the "product dierentiation" parameter  is
su!ciently large) to allow a "high cost" firms to make positive recurrent
profits in a monopolistic equilibrium. where all the other firms are "low
cost". Formally this assumption means that bE(0) ? s2j = EW0 the required
free entry recurrent profit under a O-organization.( necessarily a "low cost"
firm) . Thus, we have the following result :
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• Proposition : Assume that assumption B holds. Then there exists at
least one free entry organizational equilibrium (Eh> h) (defined by the
intersection point of the two curves EWEW and bE()) such that : a)
firms choose optimally their organizations, b) whenever firms produce
they choose optimally their production and prices to maximize profits,
c) there is free entry.
Proof: There are dierent cases to consider :
i) Suppose first that bE() never crosses curve eES () (ie. There does
not exist a value of  ? 1 such that bE() = eES ())= This means that
for all values of  5 [0> 1] bE() A eES () or bE() ? eES (). Given, that
lim<1 bE() = +4, it follows that for all  5 [0> 1] bE() A eES ()=
Under assumption B, bE(0) ? EW0 and bE(D) A eES (D) = EWD(D) .
Define b by the relation EWD() = EW0 and the function XD() by
XD() = EW0 for   b and XD() = EWD() for b ?   D.
Then it is easy to see that the function KD () = XD()  bE() is
strictly decreasing continuous in  5 [0> D] with K (0) = EW0 bE(0) A 0
and KD (D) = XD(D)  bE(D) = EWD(D)  bE(D) ? 0. Therefore there
exists a (unique) hD 5 [0> D] such that KD (hD) = 0 and the pair (EhD> hD)
with EhD = XD(hD) is a free entry organizational equilibrium.
ii) Suppose now that bE() crosses curve eES () ( necessarily only once)
at some point e.
- If e ? S , then for all  5 [S > 1], bE() A eES () and therefore bE(D) AeES (D) = EWD(D). We are back to case i) and there exists hD 5 [0> D] such
that K (hD) = 0 and the pair (EhD> hD) with EhD = XD(hD) is a free entry
organizational equilibrium.
- If S  e ? D Then we have bE(S ) ? eES (S ) = EWS (S ) andbE(D) A eES (D) = EWD(D). Again by the same token we can show that
there exists a (unique) hD 5 [0> D] such that K (hD) = 0 and the pair
(EhD> hD) with EhD = XD(hD) is a free entry organizational equilibrium.
But we we may also define as well a function XS () by
XS () = EWS () for S    1.
and KS () = XS () bE() which is strictly decreasing and continuous in
 5 [S > 1] with K (S ) = EWS (S ) bE(S ) A 0 and KS (1) = XS (1) bE(1) =
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4 ? 0. Therefore there exists as well in this case a (unique) hS 5 [S > 1]
such that KS (hS ) = 0 and the pair (EhS > hS ) with EhS = XS (hS ) is a also a
free entry organizational equilibrium.(with P-firms).
- Finally if D  e, then bE(S ) ? eES (S ) = EWS (S ) and by the same
token using the function XS () and KS () = XS () bE() which is strictly
decreasing and continuous in  5 [S > 1] > we can show that there exists a
(unique) hS 5 [S > 1] such that KS (hS ) = 0 and the pair (EhS > hS ) withEhS =
XS (hS ) is a free entry organizational equilibrium.(with P-firms). QED.
Finally, note that when assumption B does not hold, then there cannot
be an equilibrium with high cost firms and the only possible equilibrium is
an O-firm equilibrium with h = 0=
• Properties of bE(>O) as a function of conflict and market size:
From simple dierentiation we get
C bE
C =
(* 1)
(1s)3
2O

f2E
4
1s A 0
and
C bE
CO =
 * 1
1s
¸2
1

f2E
4
A 0
C2 bE
CCO =
(* 1)
(1s)3
2 1

f2E
4
1s A 0
Hence, bE() is increasing in > is shifted upward with an increase in
market size O, and the slope of bE() becomes steeper in larger markets
O=QED.
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